> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://help.getlfg.app/p/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://help.getlfg.app/p/lfg-foundation-bank.md).

# LFG Foundation

LFG's proposed customer-owned financial institution: how the foundation, member ownership, voting, shared profits and customer asset protection would work.

**Your money is yours. Your bank should be too.**

Updated 10 November 2026.

## The idea

Money can move across the internet in seconds. The institutions around it should work with the same sense of possibility.

LFG is building towards a financial institution owned by the people who use it. Customers would have a voice in its direction, a defined share in its economic success and a constitution that protects the relationship between the institution and its members.

The foundation is intended to sustain itself through the value of its services and its own resources. Your wallet balance would never become its working capital, its liquidity reserve or a fund to rescue the institution.

More people using LFG can support more useful services and a stronger foundation. When genuine profits are available after obligations and reserves, eligible customer owners would participate under published rules. Participation in decisions would be optional. You should be able to use the product without making governance a second job.

This is an ambition to change who benefits from a financial institution and who gets to shape it. Customer ownership must be reflected in enforceable rights, accountable operations and working technology, rather than a slogan or a token alone.

### Where we are today

LFG currently provides noncustodial financial software through Layer Flow Gateway, Inc. It is not a licensed bank. The foundation, customer ownership, member voting and profit distributions described here are proposed developments, not rights already granted to app users.

Throughout this guide, **current service** means what the published LFG service terms describe today. **Proposed model** means the foundation design we intend to develop. **To be defined** means a mechanism or number has not been settled. A proposed principle is not evidence that its legal or technical protections have already been implemented.

Registering interest creates no ownership interest, token entitlement or right to profits. No launch date, token price, return or distribution is promised in this guide.

## LFG today and the foundation we are building

The foundation would build on the product, rather than require customers to start with an abstract governance system.

LFG's current software supports eligible users managing their own wallets, sending and receiving supported digital assets, creating payment requests and accessing enabled third-party services. Personal accounts are currently free. Business features require the relevant subscription. Consult the current service terms for the features actually enabled for your account.

The intended customer experience brings spending, saving and payments together through familiar tools. Verified @LFG iDs are intended to make finding a person or business easier than handling long wallet addresses. Verification helps identify a contact; it does not guarantee that a payment request is genuine or that a counterparty will act honestly.

| Topic                    | Current service                                                    | Proposed foundation model                                                       |
| ------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Operator                 | Layer Flow Gateway, Inc. provides the software.                    | A foundation would hold operating company shares and protect member rights.     |
| Customer assets          | The digital asset wallet is noncustodial.                          | Customer assets would remain separate from foundation and company resources.    |
| Ownership                | App access does not itself confer equity or foundation membership. | Eligible customers would receive defined membership and economic rights.        |
| Decisions                | Current company arrangements govern the service.                   | Customer governance would operate under a protected constitution.               |
| Profits                  | App use does not currently create a right to distributions.        | Designated distributable surplus could be shared with eligible customer owners. |
| Recovery and inheritance | Current backup requirements apply.                                 | Additional recovery and inheritance tools are being explored.                   |

### Recovery and inheritance

Self-custody should give people confidence and a practical way to plan ahead. Future tools are intended to support recovery after a lost device or password and allow a customer to nominate a trusted person for access after their death.

The design ambition is advance authorisation with defined scope, verification, safeguards and a way to change the nomination while the customer is alive. The triggering evidence, waiting periods, dispute process and relationship with applicable succession requirements remain to be defined. A nomination should not be presented as a substitute for a will or as a way around mandatory inheritance rules.

These proposed tools are not a recovery promise for today's wallets. Under the current published service, LFG cannot independently restore wallet access from an email address or identity check. Customers need the independent backups required by the current terms.

## Structure and protected principles

### The foundation and service company

The proposed foundation would hold real-world shares in the operating business. A Delaware service corporation would initially continue delivering services, employing or engaging resources and maintaining provider contracts. Foundation ownership could be introduced through a full or staged transfer; the sequence remains to be settled.

Cayman has been considered as a candidate jurisdiction. No jurisdiction or entity structure should be treated as final merely because it appears in this guide. Corporate, tax, provider and market requirements must fit the actual rights and services.

| Participant                          | Intended role                                                                      | Boundary                                                        |
| ------------------------------------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Eligible customer owners             | Participate in decisions and the designated economic pool.                         | Membership does not create a direct claim to every group asset. |
| Foundation                           | Hold operating company shares, protect the constitution and implement valid votes. | It cannot appropriate customer wallet assets.                   |
| Service corporation                  | Deliver services and meet its own contractual and financial obligations.           | Its protected budget comes before upstream distributions.       |
| Accountable officers and supervisors | Carry out required approvals, oversight and duties.                                | Protective powers must be narrow and reviewable.                |
| AI agents                            | Carry out authorised operational work.                                             | They cannot expand their own powers or control customer funds.  |

Tokenised member rights would need to match the foundation constitution, company arrangements, membership register and smart contracts. Holding a token would not automatically make its holder the registered shareholder of the Delaware corporation. The enforceable rights must be set out explicitly.

### Three founding rules

The design takes inspiration from a small set of clear, ordered rules.

1. **Protect customer assets.** No vote or agent action may appropriate wallet funds, bypass required customer authorisation or count customer balances as foundation capital.
2. **Preserve the institution.** No decision may authorise diversion of assets, breach legal or financial commitments, impair protected operating reserves or be reasonably expected to materially undermine sustainable value or survival.
3. **Carry out valid member decisions.** The foundation must implement decisions that satisfy the higher rules and applicable obligations. Agents remain subordinate to the foundation.

Preserving value does not mean preventing every expense, loss or calculated risk. Developing a product costs money. The test must concern sustainable value and the institution's ability to meet its commitments, rather than an impossible promise that treasury value can only rise.

### What cannot be voted away

The proposal is for the original constitution to remain permanent. Ordinary decisions, added amendments, temporary measures, emergency powers and contract upgrades must not provide a route around its original protections.

Members could add compatible amendments through a supermajority process. Added amendments could subsequently be revised or removed through that process. They could not change, suspend or override the original constitution. Exact thresholds and participation requirements remain open.

Temporary measures would need a defined purpose, scope, duration or measurable conditions, and clear review and expiry rules. They would remain subordinate to the constitution.

These are design requirements for enforceable documents and verified controls. Calling a rule immutable does not exclude mandatory law, court powers or implementation failures.

## Revenue, treasury and shared profits

### Customer funds and foundation funds are different

Your wallet assets belong to you. They are outside the foundation's funding and distribution calculations.

The foundation's resources would come from capital genuinely contributed to it and income lawfully available from the services and businesses it owns. A large total of customer wallet balances would not make the foundation richer, increase its distributable profit or fund member exits.

### The proposed flow of money

1. The service corporation earns revenue and pays legitimate costs, taxes and other obligations.
2. It retains approved working capital and protected operating funding.
3. Amounts lawfully available for distribution can pass to the foundation, taking account of applicable tax and withholding.
4. The foundation pays its own obligations and maintains its protected reserves.
5. Eligible surplus is allocated under an approved policy between retained capital, protocol liquidity, development, member distributions and exit funding.

The intention is to account for designated treasury pools and member distributions on-chain where appropriate. Real-world bills and taxes still need to be paid. On-chain reporting does not turn gross revenue into profit or remove off-chain liabilities.

The same money cannot simultaneously fund an exit reserve, remain deployed as liquidity and be distributed as member rewards. Each allocation needs a clear purpose and accounting treatment.

### Budgets before distributions

Both the service corporation and foundation would maintain rolling twelve-month budgets, reviewed each financial quarter. The current proposal includes a normal contingency of 20%. Known risks or obligations could require more.

Operating needs come first, but that must not become an excuse to withhold all surplus indefinitely. The model calls for transparent reporting and independent review of budgets, costs and reserve decisions.

### What members would share

Eligible customer owners would participate in a designated economic pool under published rights. This is not an unrestricted claim on the whole treasury, every company asset or other customers' money.

The latest model proposes that members who do not stake can receive eligible distributions when surplus is released, while rewards allocated to staked positions remain locked for compounding. The distribution formula would consider subscription tier and the attributable value of service use. The scoring, entitlement, payment and tax details are not final.

More customers can increase revenue, but can also increase costs. Revenue growth does not guarantee a profit, and a profit does not mean all of it can be distributed. There is no fixed dividend, minimum payout or promised yield.

Any growing profit counter on the website is an illustration of the concept, not live revenue, a treasury statement or a forecast.

## Membership tokens and sustainable growth

### Who would be a member

The aim is ownership by active, verified and legally eligible customers. Both personal and business participation are intended to be addressed in the final framework. A free personal account does not currently grant tokens, and the qualifying allocation rules for every customer type must be published before membership launches.

Governance and economic eligibility must be distinguished from being allowed to open an app account. Paying for a subscription alone cannot settle every legal or membership condition.

### Joining and allocations

Higher subscription tiers are proposed to provide larger initial ownership allocations. Continuous membership can earn a capped loyalty benefit. Staking and a member's contribution through service use would also be recognised under published rules.

The latest model proposes a published admission price that converts an allocated monetary value into tokens. If that price rises, the same monetary allocation buys fewer tokens. The pricing method would take account of attributable net assets and the rights being issued; the final formula remains open.

Only capital actually allocated to ownership can back that allocation. A subscription payment spent on operating costs cannot also be counted as treasury backing. Free or discounted incentives need an explicit budget and a disclosed effect on existing members.

### A fixed ceiling with room for new members

The intended ceiling applies to **maximum outstanding supply**. Initial member allocations, founder vesting and additional staking token releases would all fit within that limit. Unissued reserve tokens would have no votes or economic entitlement.

Fractional allocations and eligible replacements for redeemed-and-burned tokens are intended to help admit new members. An annual issuance limit would control release speed separately from the overall ceiling. The numerical ceiling, annual schedule and reserve allocations remain to be defined.

The plan does not assume a ten-year customer forecast will be accurate. Issuance and admission mechanisms need to work if growth is much faster. They cannot honestly promise unlimited fresh allocations once all available capacity is committed.

A cap on outstanding tokens is different from a cap on every token ever minted. Replacement after a burn can increase lifetime minting while outstanding supply remains capped. The launch documents and contract accounting must make that distinction explicit.

### What dilution means

Fairly priced new capital can preserve or improve economic backing while existing holders' voting percentages still change. Free emissions can dilute economic rights unless supported by genuine value or a funded incentive budget. A cap alone does not guarantee a token's value.

Treasury accounting value, admission price, redemption value and any market price are different concepts. The final terms must specify each applicable calculation. There is no promised exchange listing, price floor or automatic ability to sell.

### Staking and rewards

Staking would lock eligible tokens under published conditions. Rewards allocated to that position are intended to remain locked and compound the member's participation. Members who do not stake would retain the rights specified for unstaked membership.

Rewards could vary or pause to protect operating runway, reserves and sustainable value. Additional token releases must stay within the supply ceiling and reward budget. Creating more tokens is not the same as earning a profit.

Historical rebasing models such as Olympus are a design reference. They do not commit LFG to reproduce another protocol or pay its historical returns.

Wrapping may be used to manage eligibility, locking or redemption. It does not establish a guaranteed tax outcome or a universal rule that tax only arises on unwrapping. No such tax benefit is promised by this model.

### Leaving membership

The intended model links governance to active customer membership. After a published cancellation grace period, voting eligibility and new loyalty rewards would stop. Treatment of unvested allocations would follow the terms accepted at admission.

Vested economic rights should remain protected through an orderly exit. The preferred mechanism is scheduled treasury redemption using a separately budgeted exit reserve, followed by token burning as settlement occurs. Replacement tokens could then be issued to new eligible members under the supply and funding rules.

Cancellation would not mean burning a person's vested rights without payment. Nor would it guarantee an instant buyer or immediate redemption at an assumed market price. Valuation, settlement periods, liquidity limits and treatment during exceptional conditions remain to be settled.

Customer assets and protected operating funding must not finance member exits. Membership termination also needs objective grounds, notice and an appeal route so disagreement with management cannot be used to force someone out unfairly.

## Decisions, voting and founder limits

### Participation is optional

Members could propose improvements, support proposals and vote on priorities. They would not need to vote in every decision to use LFG. Participation and economic eligibility would be specified separately, so abstaining should not be confused with cancelling membership.

### Three equally weighted criteria

The latest proposal uses three criteria, each contributing one third of the combined voting score:

| Criterion                  | Intended basis                                                         | What remains open                                                |
| -------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Subscription tier          | Recognises the member's subscription commitment.                       | Tier scores and the effect of upgrades or downgrades.            |
| Staked equity              | Recognises eligible tokens committed through staking.                  | Normalisation, snapshots, limits and subscription adjustments.   |
| Attributable service value | Recognises the value the member's own use contributes to the treasury. | Attribution, tier ranges, scoring caps and anti-gaming measures. |

Equal overall weights do not mean adding raw subscription dollars, token counts and transaction volumes together. Each needs a defined scoring scale before the combined result can be calculated.

Members who do not stake could still participate through the other two criteria. Unissued, redeemed and treasury-held tokens would not vote. The voting formula is separate from the profit distribution formula.

The proposed score combines subscription commitment, eligible stake and attributable service value. Its final scoring must be published before voting begins.

### From an idea to a decision

Any eligible member could raise a proposal and seek support. A defined backing threshold would take a supported proposal to the full ownership circle for a vote, subject to the constitution. This gives smaller members a route to participation while controlling spam.

Members could voluntarily form voting blocs to pool support and influence. Rules would govern joining, leaving, delegation, conflicts and the prevention of double counting. Founder restrictions would still apply to delegated or pooled influence.

Voting needs published notice periods, quorum, snapshots, voting windows and an execution delay. Numerical thresholds and the distinction between ordinary and supermajority decisions remain open.

### A limited protective veto

Accountable directors or supervisors could block execution only where it breaches the founding rules, applicable duties, customer protection or objective operating and reserve requirements.

They would need to publish reasons and explain what would make the proposal compliant. A challenge process and independent review are intended to prevent this becoming a general management veto over choices it dislikes.

If a budget is delayed, limited fallback funding should keep essential services running while a revised proposal is considered. A foundation vote would not erase the service company's separate obligations.

### Founder allocations

Moh, Kris and Fahad are proposed to receive disclosed launch allocation entitlements within a fixed aggregate founder cap. Vesting would depend on time and objectively measured net treasury growth. The percentages, periods and measurement rules are not yet final.

The aim is a non-discretionary release when valid conditions are met, subject to law and the founding protections. A later member vote should not arbitrarily cancel an earned release. Equally, founder entitlements cannot override the supply ceiling or protection of customer assets.

Genuine net growth must be distinguished from borrowed assets, new issuance proceeds and changes in the quoted price of LFG's own token. Unvested entitlements would not vote. Their economic rights and treatment on departure require express terms.

### Founders must remain a minority

The proposed safeguard is stronger than keeping the founder allocation below half of maximum supply. Combined founder voting influence must remain below 50% of eligible voting power at launch and afterwards, across all three criteria and controlled wallets, proxies, delegates, blocs and subsequent acquisitions.

Sufficient non-founder approval should be required so low turnout cannot turn a founder minority into control. If customer exits would breach the limit, founder votes should be constrained rather than taking rights away from other members.

Founders must not have extraction, upgrade, appointment or emergency powers that bypass these protections. These are safeguards to implement and test, not proof that collusion, exploitation or loss can never occur.

## AI operations and protocol-owned liquidity

### An institution designed for automation

The foundation and service company are intended to be designed from the outset for extensive AI-agent operation. Agents could support software development, service improvements, administration, finance, reporting and legal-support work.

The foundation would define their mandates, permissions and budgets, monitor their work and suspend or replace them when necessary. Agents would not govern the foundation, enlarge their own authority, access customer funds or have unilateral authority over the treasury.

Separation of duties, independent checks, audit logs, controlled upgrades and appropriately authorised execution would be required. Named people and relevant professionals would still perform required approvals, signatures, oversight and legal responsibilities. Automation does not turn an organisation into an entity without accountability.

### What protocol-owned liquidity means

Liquidity is the capital and assets available to support transactions and services. Protocol-owned liquidity means assets the foundation or protocol genuinely owns and commits under its rules.

The intention is to build core liquidity from retained surplus and genuinely contributed capital, rather than depend on essential funding that an outside lender or liquidity provider can withdraw or condition on control.

Borrowed assets carry repayment obligations. Rented liquidity can leave. Neither should be counted as unencumbered protocol-owned capital simply because it appears in a foundation-controlled wallet.

The foundation may still need banks, asset issuers, payment networks, exchanges and service providers. Commercial relationships do not automatically give them governance rights, but they can still create operational dependence. Any proposed borrowing, encumbrance or rented liquidity must be separately disclosed and tested against the constitution's permanent funding principles.

### The goal is resilience

Owning core liquidity can reduce dependence on outside capital. It cannot eliminate provider decisions, law, network outages, market losses or asset-issuer risk. Liquidity deployed into markets can lose value or become difficult to withdraw.

Treasury reporting should distinguish operating protection, deployed liquidity, member economic allocations and exit reserves. Customer wallet balances are outside all of them.

## Roadmap and open decisions

### A sequence for building the model

| Stage                      | Intended result                                                                                   | Status                                           |
| -------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------ |
| Explain the proposal       | Publish the principles, gather questions and refine the design.                                   | This guide is a discussion draft.                |
| Establish the structure    | Settle the jurisdiction, enforceable member rights, ownership transfer and provider arrangements. | Not represented as completed.                    |
| Build and test governance  | Implement membership, voting, treasury controls, founder restrictions and exits.                  | Detailed mechanics and verification remain open. |
| Launch eligible membership | Publish final terms, supported markets, allocation rules and actual enabled rights.               | No date or entitlement is promised.              |
| Expand resilience          | Retain capital, improve liquidity and pursue appropriate permissions in selected markets.         | Long-term direction.                             |
| Assess additional assets   | Consider a separate stablecoin initiative where it solves a demonstrated need.                    | Optional future work.                            |

Licences may be pursued through suitable operating entities as the services evolve. Holding a foundation or deploying governance code does not itself authorise banking, token issuance or a public investment offer. No specific licence application, approval or ownership transfer is asserted here.

### A possible KNOX asset

A future asset such as KNOX could support settlement or liquidity. It would be separate from the customer governance token. Its issuer, ownership, relationship to LFG and reference asset would need to be settled explicitly; earlier concepts have also explored an independent protocol that LFG could integrate.

A gold-referenced asset would track a gold reference rather than maintain a fixed dollar price. A dollar-referenced design would be a different commitment. Neither should be presented as chosen or launched today.

Any such initiative would need its own backing, reserve custody, issuance, redemption, controls and regulatory arrangements. Reserves backing claims of asset holders cannot also be treated as free capital for member rewards or ordinary operating costs. Creating an internal token does not by itself bring external purchasing power into the foundation.

### Decisions to publish before launch

* Jurisdiction, entity relationships, transfer sequence and enforceable beneficiary rights.
* Total outstanding supply ceiling, founder cap, issuance schedule and reserve allocation.
* Admission price, free or paid customer qualification, loyalty rules and incentive budgets.
* Staking periods, compounding rules, reward budgets and treatment of unstaked members.
* Distribution calculations, entitlement snapshots, reserves and reporting standards.
* Voting scales, tier adjustments, attribution measures, backing thresholds and quorum.
* Amendment, temporary-measure, review, appeal and emergency procedures.
* Founder vesting metrics, independent verification and limits on effective control.
* Exit valuation, settlement windows, liquidity constraints and membership termination rights.
* Actual agent permissions, treasury execution controls and independent assurance.
* Supported ownership markets and the applicable legal, tax and offering arrangements.

These decisions should be published before people are asked to rely on the corresponding rights. An undecided number should remain labelled undecided, rather than be filled with a convenient example.

## Questions people ask

### What is the LFG Foundation in one sentence?

It is a proposed customer ownership and governance structure intended to let eligible LFG users shape the institution and share designated profits while keeping their wallet assets separate.

### Is LFG a bank now?

No. LFG currently provides noncustodial software. References to a customer-owned bank describe the ambition, not a current banking licence or protected deposit account.

### Do I own LFG just by opening an account?

No. App access and registration of interest do not currently grant ownership. Any future membership would depend on published eligibility and admission terms.

### Is this for personal users or businesses?

The ownership ambition concerns the people and businesses using LFG. Final qualification and allocation rules for each customer type remain to be defined.

### Will I have to buy an expensive subscription to participate?

Higher subscription tiers are proposed to influence allocations and voting scores. That does not settle the qualifying rules for free personal users. No minimum ownership subscription has been announced here.

### Do I have to vote?

Participation is intended to be optional. Members could use the services without voting on every proposal. The final terms must define eligibility and any delegation options.

### Is voting just one token one vote?

Not under the latest proposal. Subscription tier, staked equity and attributable service value each contribute one third of a combined score. The detailed scoring formula is still open.

### Can a smaller member propose something?

Yes, the proposed route lets any eligible member raise an idea and gather support. A proposal reaching the published backing threshold would proceed to the ownership circle, subject to the constitution.

### Can members organise together?

Voluntary voting blocs are proposed so members can pool support and influence. Eligibility, authorisation and anti-double-counting rules would still apply.

### Can a vote spend customer wallet money?

No. Protecting customer assets is a founding design rule. Customer balances must not become operating funds, liquidity or member rewards.

### Where would member profits come from?

From genuine distributable surplus, after costs, taxes, obligations and protected reserves. Customer balances and newly created tokens are not earned profits.

### Does everyone get the same payout?

No equal cash amount has been promised. The latest design links economic allocations to membership terms, subscription tier and attributable service value, with staking affecting how allocated rewards are retained. The final formula remains open.

### Does holding more tokens mean owning more of every asset?

Not automatically. The rights concern the designated economic pool and governance framework. They must not be described as an unconditional claim on every group asset or the entire treasury.

### Are rewards or a token price guaranteed?

No. Profits may be unavailable, rewards may vary or pause and a token can lose value. No APY, price floor, exchange listing or instant redemption is promised.

### What happens if LFG grows very quickly?

Admission pricing, fractional allocations, reserves and eligible replacements after redemption are intended to support growth within the supply ceiling. They cannot create unlimited capacity once that ceiling is fully committed.

### Are burned tokens gone forever?

The preferred design burns tokens at settled exits and permits eligible replacements within the maximum outstanding supply and release rules. The replacement mechanism and annual limits still need final terms and implementation.

### What happens if I cancel?

After the applicable grace period, governance and new loyalty rewards would stop. Vested rights would enter the agreed exit process. They should not disappear through an unpaid burn, and immediate cash redemption is not guaranteed.

### Can an outsider buy control on an exchange?

Unrestricted external trading is not proposed. Membership and voting would be limited to active verified eligible customers and approved wallets. These controls still need to address coordinated actors who qualify as customers.

### Could the founders take control?

The design requires combined founder influence below 50% of eligible voting power, with protection against low-turnout control and hidden influence through delegates or controlled wallets. Those safeguards still need enforceable implementation.

### Could an AI take over or move my money?

Agents would remain within foundation-approved permissions and could not expand their own authority or access customer funds. They would have no unilateral treasury authority.

### Why might a vote be blocked?

Only for a defined conflict with founding rules, legal duties, customer protection or objective operating requirements. Reasons, a challenge process and independent review are part of the proposed protection against abuse.

### Can members change the constitution?

Compatible amendments could be added, revised or removed through a supermajority process. The original constitutional protections are proposed to remain permanent. Exact voting thresholds are not yet set.

### Does owning liquidity remove all outside influence?

No. It can reduce reliance on withdrawable external capital. Providers, networks, law and asset issuers still affect what the institution can do.

### Can I nominate someone to access my funds after my death?

That is a planned inheritance capability, not a current promise. Nomination scope, verification, revocation, triggering conditions and dispute procedures remain to be defined.

### Does wrapping mean I pay tax only when I unwrap?

No such outcome is promised. Wrapping is a possible technical mechanism, not a universal tax exemption or deferral rule. Individual treatment needs a separate assessment.

### Is KNOX the ownership token?

No. KNOX is an optional future settlement or stable-asset concept, separate from customer governance rights. Its design and relationship to the foundation remain undecided.

### When can I join the foundation?

You can register interest where the website offers that option. Ownership launches only when the final structure, eligibility and terms are published and implemented. No launch date is given here.

## Current service reference

Use the linked service documents for current account eligibility, pricing and provider conditions. This proposed foundation design does not change those terms.

LFG account availability and a provider's permission to serve a particular sender are separate decisions. A supported payout destination does not establish sender eligibility. Network and provider charges, processing times and limits can vary.

The published availability statement currently distinguishes free personal accounts from paid business features and describes separate checks for off-ramp senders. Owl/Harbor, the off-ramp provider, currently excludes EU-citizen individual senders, including those living outside the EU, and EU-incorporated business senders. Eligible non-EU senders may still have supported payouts to EU bank destinations. These off-ramp conditions do not establish the availability of other LFG features.

Check the current schedule rather than inferring availability from a country name, SEPA coverage or LFG's place of incorporation.

### Service documents

* [Terms of Service](https://help.getlfg.app/p/agreements/terms-of-service.md)
* [Regulatory Position Statement](https://help.getlfg.app/p/agreements/regulatory-position-statement.md)
* [Global Availability Statement](https://help.getlfg.app/p/global-availability-statement.md)
* [Privacy Policy](https://help.getlfg.app/p/agreements/privacy-policy.md)

For account-specific assistance, use <support@getlfg.app>. Do not send wallet recovery phrases or private keys.

## Glossary

| Term                     | Meaning in this proposal                                                                     |
| ------------------------ | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Customer owner           | An eligible member with rights defined by the final membership framework.                    |
| Constitution             | The governing rules protecting purpose, duties and member decision-making.                   |
| Distributable surplus    | Funds available for allocation after required costs, obligations and reserves.               |
| Treasury                 | Assets owned by the foundation or relevant operating entity, separate from customer wallets. |
| Protocol-owned liquidity | Capital genuinely owned and committed under protocol or foundation rules.                    |
| Outstanding supply       | Tokens currently issued and not burned, subject to the approved accounting definition.       |
| Admission price          | The published basis for converting an ownership allocation into tokens.                      |
| Staking                  | Locking eligible tokens under defined terms.                                                 |
| Redemption               | Settlement of a member's economic rights under the agreed exit mechanism.                    |
| Voting bloc              | Members voluntarily pooling support or authorised voting influence.                          |
| KNOX                     | An optional future asset initiative, separate from the governance token.                     |

This guide explains the proposed model. It is not an adopted constitution, token offering, banking authorisation or a guarantee of launch or returns. Final enforceable terms will define any rights that become available.
